

8-26-08

Notes on SLOP-62

Not Sec
Archives

Since 1938 (70 years ago)

(2) - defeat Hitler: prevent ~~Hitler~~ Hitler from getting A-bomb.

Since

(b) - percentage degree of success: A/H (100%, for US!)

Since late mid-1944 (no human MP)

(b) is highest priority for species survival? ^{insurance} _{at threat} ^{loss}

(What did global warming work a cross-revels?

What could it / should it have been avoided? (Fossil fuels
used, alternatives?)

Since .. 1958 (50 years) - survival of most (?)

species has been at imminent risk

(a risk that could be "easily, quickly" eliminated" — ~~that~~ not risk of massive, irreversible damage (50 explosions?)

like, a levee bursting (Katrina)
on iceberg (Titanic)

still class:-

- casualty ests

- China - low bloc
(now declass.)

(Delay)

- deliberate attack
on population
(U-I; calculations
of impact)

- JSCP - GW def

- number of "base-yield"
(20MT? 24MT?) is
staggered; varied

- nos - on prose

no -

still unrecognized by NSA

- FS plan

- for "all" purposes of fighting
low

- "premises" of low
conventional attack, or
conventional counter-ess,
or more counter-ess
not first, or rarely, SU FS
or FU

- fire damage

- more winter

- ionosphere

- GW def

- ambiguity of "det" (2009)
Type I, Type II

- drop air

- "interference" problem

- ests of SU missiles
+ long-term controversy!

- SU MRBMs/IRBMs/BADGERS

Lynne Eden: 650-725-5369

Stanford 650-723-2300

+ NATO/EUR

anti, ADMs

Ref
- USAF committed to pop. targets

- MIC influence + fire
- Pop. damage (+ fallout)

from conventional / too powerful!
(+ UK, French!)

USAF: to defeat, must be able to "prevail"

"Overkill" - Kitz, 2 Feb 60

USAF - "Can't" "overkill"

high demand

criteria (90% prob.)

can't have "too many missiles, bombers"

(neg. value: crit. force, for

enemy deaths ~~*~~)

US planes, missiles

(Kitch. deaths of pers

afternoon

(see previous)

1961 Henthoff: (then used NIE, 4 ICBSH,

US forces were "adequate"

(not "too small." Could be

"too large"

CINCPAC GEOP - alt. unstable

Range: U-I only

- air at "surround" - but destroys C³!

Cities as Targets

U-I

("pop": $\frac{1}{3}$ pop of SU)

(Harris

Doulet

B. 12 ^{NSA} Summary No

16. All surface bursts (final!) - "Bonus damage" (in SU -
at expense of all others - East & West, all in, all
average: 3.8 MT (235 Hiroshima)

* see Blockbuster: fall-out on friendly forces (S. Korea...
and countries, ventrals ^{see "interference"})

h.12

Many: deprecates "presumption" because
it implies large USAF forces/budget
while not preventing serious damage to US

West Europe?

even mentioned?

30 Dec
60

What Army/Mary/MC covers not fall-out from
(all!) surface bursts, even submerised?

h.21 the

the + the "troubled" - but accepted?

W's

(several large weapons to
one target, all ground-burst)

alt

18 Jan 61

"Cover" for world efforts, + on allies, US forces,
US(?) (neutrals?! even mentioned?)

SIOB as "an engine generating essential force requirements"

(What was the original intention for 2009 and NSTAP, SIOB,
etc.? What is the cover (now 58 with expression
distraction? No!

the presumably wanted either a mid-air (presumption) list
or a U-I list (interviews: deterrent. Many)

but "opt-mix" list was both (for 'all purposes':

really, presumption: but the, why U-I?

John, McN explains on short forces (added arguments?!)

unnecessary: belief in "gap" (RAND: 2d strike)

John, "S-S D-L" makes "vital" = presumption!

^{val}
Key issues: - Who was in charge? (SAC)
- Force size, budget, division

What was the rush to get to SIOF - "best available"

without resolving "concerns" over ground hunts, redundancy, China, fall-out, would infect, overkill.

What is current status?

Civics, & Congress, still cut out?

Priority review continuing?

See "degrading" effect of WWII extermination

(>10 A-bombs for Japan?)

Max civ cas. (not "min," as told to Strasser)

Nov 58: She calls for retial. attack on reducing ability of USSR to recover [Cantledge]

(to reduce force requires? US budget?)

NESSC in 58 hit too many city targets

"used to have as many than 70 targets in SU -
"sufficient"

McGuire: Handled, dispersed SU (CBMs" (0)

Problem of "Conflicts" (depending on TOT's) routes
"mutual interference"

Absence of post-H-bom comm (used for
autonomy,
fire plans)

"We would never
strike the first
blow" (NO-
provocation war:
USAF: Hard to design
a FS force with this
posture"

JCS discussions seem to ignore real cases belli (FS):
esp of SU attack on Europe, Berlin, esp
element ...

even USAF focuses on SU FS (perhaps with "warning")

Difference between SU ICBMs "in power regions" (SACast 1961)
Paris, Aug 59

(1961: four integers:
off by 250X

in, Aug, 1961 (SAC

and in 1968 (Nobility) ("power" in powerful ICBMs;

↓ thought vulnerability of SAC power was

an urgent, critical problem (soft, liquid-fuel,
planes...)

= RAND, 1952/54-62

IT WAS NOT

Heavy force is on the "safe side"

(Not at expense of: ^{reduced} focus on arms control/agreements
(force)

-(NOC WINTER)

or of: - increased FS cap. (US intention)

- SU build-up

- increased chance of unstable - war

(1983: 1962

US & SU function TCS

Polaris (+ carriers) vs. land based, piped bases
(time, for future)

[If RAND had worked for the Army
or Navy ...

If RAND didn't had gone into OSD from that ...

Neglect of - SU retal. on West Europe


- Provocative/detabling efforts of
- Kanner and control

- US FS cap.

FS July 60 - USAF ^{that working on} response to
SU attack on an ally (US initiated)

Army (+ Navy) constraints on ground
bursts and on full-art on friendly
forces + people NOT implemented in SIOP-62
VS. GROUND BURSTS (later?)

Send to Frank: [issue is force levels / ^{alloc. of} budget.
4W forces (carriers) vs. 6W forces (SAC)
If SAC controls & huge forces, [huge damage],
huge target list & locked in (electronics industry,
(air industry) (water...)]
THE US PROJECT
The business of US is ...



TO DO:

- that info marked

Since
~~1994~~
2004?

- ask Sam for 2009 Cens. figs
Compare w/ notes

- see question & answer, on final resolution

✓ - Is Ritz memo available? Nov 60
Power explosion? → to JFK?

- see N briefing
- JFK "

Was VSCP available to Holmes, or not?
(referred to in 1959-60!)
not to JFK/MCG/McN/Holifield

- Call Rosenberg
"

- What is known on SU targeting, plans?
Any rev. in placement?
(Blavin)

?
Blackburn, 26 Oct:

- Fall-out on friendly countries!

[TOO MUCH DESTRUCTION - OF SU!]

fall-out on

US forces in Europe!

(like POWs in Hiroshima)

Externalities!

Cumulative systemic effects: water systems/
fire

(but fire is ignored!)

15 Nov sent for completion

4 (3?) 30 Nov - 3 Dec for JCS review } Benke:
after election
(ass. negotiation)

Sub-optimization (the Hitch!)

also, of pop. damage
ests based

on 7 wpm for OGC

SAC focus only on blast

ignoring effects of fall-out
(on rest of world!)

and of fire: on pop., and smoke
(over units)
(evacuation)

and duplication

and concerns, CINCPAC, EUR

TAC forces

mexing SAC force requirements, but

(BONOS?)


enormous understatement pop. damage in SU/China

> 600M!

ecological damage: ^{SU} world
fall-out " "

EXTERNALITIES (+ SOV forces: IGNORED (fall-out, fire...)

What did I say about grand blunts?



(Real concern with "interference" in GEOP 1959
Delusion!

Context: (2) ^{Hidden criteria} the concern with budget

Bunker proposed to
realign

Hate desire to get
agreements.

b) Service mainly on budget
+ roles

c) budget (LW vs. GW)

d) Imperial (CW) aims TW, ME

(e) US ^{role} ans in Europe, NATO

Note: Any-Body together on SIO, roles & missions, commitments

but also on estimates: never mentioned in these
docs.

Was there a controversy on testing?

+ what of Berlin planning throughout this?

SO "Berlin attack" was also an illusion throughout
'50's.

the, JFK, (LBJ?) N all "appalled" by kill-figures -
but accept, do nothing to lower!

Context: (with date) Reagan? Ha ... Bush I?

Clinton? (8 years...) Bush II (LW)

CNO Nov 20, 1960

SIOB.

Hyp: A FS plan is designed as if it were
a 2nd-strike plan ^① with reduced forces

^② and no warning
(no carriers, TAC, no -
all-weather;
forces)
③ (not no G²) (pre-planned) — against a ^④ full
SU target system (how many ICBMs assumed?
location?)
all
— to maximize SAC force requirements

(no coordination of fire or system efforts...)

⑤ grand bursts (more forces!)

⑥ initial attack only ~~to~~ to prevail

⑦ U-I in initial attacks (though inevitably,
not true-urgent)

⑧ better "inequality," not critical limits

Neither optimized for initiation or retal!

on ①: Long has intent is showing vulnerability of
land bases — esp. SU estimates

⑨ NSTL too large (ONI: 500 D626; SIOB 750)

⑩ "misses" don't count against pop. damage (!)
(Requirements for extermination under-estimated)

$\frac{1}{3}$ of ^{SU} pop. killed: GENOCIDE

USAF — more intent to inflate force size
than to reduce fall-out, pop. damage
(NOT a consideration)

Planning meetings on SIOP = WANNSEE CONF.

(see objections — ignored
of what was not raised in objection)

(Wannsee not biased by desire to maximize
forces required (and to economize — to
be efficient
to focus on SU war)

on pop. damage:
no consideration of showering winds;
multiple weapons
would effects
SU attacks!
follow-on, two waves

(see planning of first attacks in paper:
tactics optimized to max deaths
(see reply to Fisher)

|| (most odd?) of these defects must have existed
in planning since 1945 — in SAC (& theaters?)

Given def. of "GW" under the,
"detection of GW" could "fail" under
2 very different circumstances: axis + capability
very different, forces very different:

- SU FS

- US FS latter is described (correct) as if

it encompasses only 2 different levels of "warning" ("promptness")

CINCLANT - level of damage required "requires blast damage
only" (?)

To SAC/USAF, killing pop. is neither undesirable
nor merely "bonus": it is essential (and to
be maximized)

just as China regards torture

and mutilation

and aggression

(Dick Eden knew/realized
the concern of Army/Navy in 1959-60
that threat & restriction should be
considered?)

(USAF wanted: max force levels

max "bonus" (correct))

(pop. damage higher than calculated
is good — even though it causes
more fallout in other countries,
even on US persons)
+ Dave Wright

I didn't know it, but many of my objectives
were covered by Army/Navy.
(ineffectively) (If we had looked at
Gardner!)

NO Plans with: to change SAC plans — to
eliminate massive pop. damage
(impossible, with large, land SU
ICBM force? + C3 centers?
Wf attack there — on either side?
see subs!


If SU could have been held to 1961-62 level?
under K: 1963 — early 1964 (LBJ)
instead of worrying about RT/NVN?


"Opt.-mix" SIOF has effort that U-I are
not just for retal/deterrence, but included in
initial "preventive" attacks (USAF?)

smalling requires for them
while CF are included in "retal." attacks

" " " "

least smalling fallout/pop
in SU not others!





TELL

2d Study D-L was meaningful until about 1964, not after

but ¹⁾ (since it led to high - count - plans -
force requirements

and (2) intervention

TELL

it continued to be calculated (w/ w/ McN:

NOT MAD

as did FS - D-L

Delusion

in belief that SU surprise attack was
still "possible" (+ US FU/FS still needed, "credible")

TELL

- true, but only because of US
FS ^{FU} doctrine + posture: (SU perception
2d Study D-L...

ie. deep, on both sides

TELL

Stability was available, but not achieved

both
continued
to HK,
RAND

Good SU diversion capability was available
to SU only in 1959-61 - but not prepared for,
built.

Good US cap (but not w/ Europe!)
available from 1946-68 and was built:

but not used, except on threat

(later, too, subject to
some mental instability, D-L exp.)

MCN 4 Feb

(apparently there were U-I targets in
satellites!

MCN covered about fallout (en = SU!)
events withholding

(My covers showed of "any reasonable frame":
Army, Navy, (State), Kint, MCN, ^{CINCPAC} CANT, PAC
USMC

e.g. Sharp, FU 8, 61 on China and Blue case + withholds

MCN wanted (Feb 4) more about force
more airborne about
U-I targets under "most probable"
conditions

(Well, if he makes out FU/FS!)

SIOP-62 simply approved what had been
SAC planning all along!
as dist 2009!

W44 "Single Plan" \Rightarrow Single Target list [for GW!]

How could 2009 conclude that U-I-only or
mil-only (!) was not adequate for Type I Dets?!

OR that a Single Target list was approp.
for Type I and Type II?!

OR that U-I should be in initial attacks
for Type II? or function?

How could SAC ignore effects of (ground burst)
fallout on other countries?

WHY NOT Polaris only for Type I Det?! no time
wasting!

8-27-08

WHAT DID SIOF-62 assume for SU ICBMs? Q-1
MRBMs? 1961!

What did NESC assume was SU target list

- surprise attack? Cities?

How many missiles did it assume, for 1961?

(in 1958-59)

Any-way?

What of What Europe fatalities?

from SU attacks?

What were targets

from fallout

of MRBMs?

Numbers?

US
from attacks in East Europe?

1958? - NES 2009?

FROM US-SU too was in East Europe?
fall-out?

2009/SIOF-62 probably looked "acceptable"

(a) by comparison to previous: SAC + threat "chase"

(b) by infiltrating SAC, exposing it to JCS/Service criticism
(my Quinn! Efforts?

Hyp: A by controversy - ¹⁾ whether was killing pop.

was essential/effective/legit in winning war (USAF)

2) Whether FS was feasible

O-2

US capabilities

etc

killing/

Power

(Harsh?)

(as EUR?)

Any-way lots out in favor of this!

(not on Poland) yet SIOF not optimal for it

O-I: non-
prioritization

NSA:

How much duplication did SIOB-62 eliminate?

(+ - VPM? - now get briefed on SIOB!

despite clearance

What does successive delays

(+ delays)

Memorial to NSA about

1) "and for prolonged survey?"

2) "and reasons" " " " ?

3) what remains present? Wf?

Talk to: Ball

Rosenberg

Blair (movie: are written?

Blair

Leon Blais?

(Schlesinger!

HAK!

Schall

Long Kegan

NSM-3

Kukerun?!

Henthoff

Gen. BUTLER Sh

Hentrich
(Harrison?)

(NATO generals? Canberra Group?

UN

"Mutuals threatened by fall-out
are written"

in list

Herman

Point

Pendurich

Crucial

TR

- Scanning

- Re-type? memo with Nelson

(to Halle?)


(10s: Rodby?)

Stannis

- MHN/Queney

me, on JSCP....

BNSP (SIOP-63)



Now winter — survival for the attaching comets
as in Doonday Merbie (+ others)
or On the Beach

press (incoming) of fallout

(not expected for neighbors
to SU/China!)